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The Global Demographic Benefit of International Migration : a Hypothesis 
By Philippe Fargues, European University Institute, Florence 
First draft–—unfinished—in progress 
 
Introduction 
How can demography bring a specific response to the question on whether international migration 
is a « positive sum game »? This paper advances a daring argument: that international migration 
has contributed to contain the demographic explosion, more precisely that population movements 
from developing to more developed countries during the last decades have resulted in a smaller 
global world population than the one which would have been obtained had no international 
migration taken place. In other words, it argues that international migration has contributed to 
check the nightmare of world overpopulation1.  
The mechanism through which international migration is hypothesised to play on global 
demography is simple: most migration during the period of demographic transition2—a period 
when international differentials in birth rates are peaking—has been from high to low birth rates 
countries. Because international migrants adopt for themselves, and send back to their home 
countries, models and ideas that prevail in host countries, they are agents of the diffusion of 
demographic modernity.  
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) offers a particularly interesting case in point for testing 
the hypothesis that migrants are potential vectors of demographic change. Several MENA countries 
witness an intense emigration, with emigrants bound either for the Gulf or for the West, according 
to countries of departure and time. With regard to demographic differentials encountered through 
migration, MENA thus offers contrasted situations: host countries of emigrants are sometimes less, 
sometimes more advanced in their demographic transition than their home countries. If the central 
hypothesis of the paper is true, then emigration from MENA countries will have modified the 
                                          
1 Looking at the long term, the common sense would on the contrary associate migration with the search for vital 
space, that is with the demographic expansion of mankind rather than the reduction of its rate of growth. As Kingsley 
Davis (1988) puts it « Liberal political and economic leaders tend to believe that a movement from areas of high 
population density to areas of low population density is […] desirable [while] their opponents point out that the Earth 
is already too crowded, that migration by helping to fill the last remaining open spaces, is making the crowding 
worse » (p. 252-3). In a long historical perspective, it is true that migration has often resulted in peopling scarcely 
peopled areas. However, things have changed: there are no longer ‘empty’ places and the world is now divided into 
well delineated political entities, between which strong economic differentials are the main factor of migration, 
disregarding population density. 
2 The “demographic transition” is the shift from high to low levels of mortality and natality, with a time gap between 
the decrease of mortality and that of natality, and consequently a period of rapid population growth when mortality is 
already low while natality is still high. 
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course of the demographic transition of origin countries of migrants in two opposite directions, 
according to places of destination: slowing it down where emigrants are destined to the Gulf and 
speeding it up where they emigrate to the West.  
The paper is divided into five sections. Section I examines the place of migration in demographic 
analysis. Section II proposes a general framework of interaction between migration and 
demographic change. Section III is a rapid overview of the well-documented side of this 
framework, i.e. the impact of migration on the demography of migrants. Section IV is a very first 
attempt to explore the other side of the framework, i.e. the impact of migration on the demography 
of non-migrants in countries experiencing significant rates of emigration, with MENA as an 
example. Section 5 offers a partial validation of the main hypothesis by comparing Morocco to 
Egypt. 
 
1.  The demographic ideal of a closed population  
Migration was never built up by demographers at the same level of formal elaboration as the two 
other components of population change, i.e. birth rates and death rates which form together the 
‘natural’ growth of any population. Migration is absent from the core model of formal 
demography—known as the ‘theory of stable populations’—and methods for estimating migration 
are much less settled than those devised for measuring fertility and mortality.   
Formal demography is anchored in the tradition of biology. It models population reproduction as 
the result of two biological processes, natality and mortality3. The modern mathematical 
demography founded by Alfred Lotka simply excludes external migration4: « By a very natural 
abstraction, demographic analysis envisages as a point of departure the case of a closed population, 
that is to say, a population whose numbers receive new accessions only through births and suffers 
losses only through deaths, immigration and emigration being excluded » (Lotka  1998 [1939], p. 
53). Basic analytical models—to begin with the most commonly used of them, the life table, which 
describes the extinction of a generation « in the absence of external migration »—are constructed 
                                          
3 Marriage is the third central topic of formal demography, since marriage—or more generally the entry into union—is 
recognised a key “proximate determinant” of fertility.  
4 In this section we use the term ‘external’ rather than ‘international’ migration. The latter refers to nations, a modern 
division of the world which bears no meaning for most of history, while the former refers inclusively to any sort of 
territory. 
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on the assumption of a « closed » population, a population that receives or sends no external 
migration5. 
True populations however are not closed. States, or nations, define populations and borders 
separate national populations from one another. As soon as a population is delineated by a border, 
border crossing becomes one of the factors of its growth and reproduction. For Lotka this is not a 
reason for introducing migration in the fundamental demographic equations: « Demographic 
statistics is concerned primarily with human populations, and particularly with certain more or less 
isolated populations, as for example those of a nation […] The practical problems [posed by 
migration across borders] are reduced more and more as the area included in the study expands, 
since emigration and immigration are plainly functions of the border periphery, whereas births and 
deaths are instead functions of the land area, and the ratio between the periphery and the internal 
area continuously decreases as the latter increases. Circumstances of politics and commerce further 
tend to accentuate that effect, so that for an entire country migration can in certain cases be almost 
negligible as a factor determining the growth of its population […] » (Ibid.) 6. 
States are not only frames of reference for the delimitation of populations, they also form the actual 
frame of population data collection. Statistical records thus incorporate migration, implicitly in 
vital statistics7 or explicitly in migration statistics. As a result, migration is a matter of interest for 
demographers, which they take into account as soon as they leave models for tackling real 
statistics. Their interest in migration can follow two very distinct purposes: either eliminating 
migration from vital records for its interference with biological demography, or measuring 
migration for its contribution to overall demography. 
                                          
5 Keyfitz (1968) later introduced the notion of   “interacting populations”, and the tool of “immigration vector” in the 
mathematics of population. 
6 Interestingly, theories of international migration do not put a greater emphasis on demography than the one 
demographic theory puts on international migration. Economic theories recognise that international differentials are 
key factors of migration, but they rarely consider demographic differentials (in population density or population 
growth) as true factors. Only few of them would endorse a statement such as « modern migration stems mainly from 
the difference in population growth between the developed and the less developed countries » (Davis 1988 p. 256). In 
fact, there are too many exceptions to make a rule of it. To take a Middle Eastern example, Lebanon is a country of 
emigration to Saudi Arabia, despite the fact that Lebanon has a much lower rate of natural population growth than 
Saudi Arabia (below 1% compared with 3.3% in 1995-2000), and Lebanon is a place of immigration for Syrian, 
despite the fact it has a much higher demographic density than Syria. 
7 For example, international migration affects death records and consequently the statistical observation of mortality: 
the death of an emigrant escapes national statistics of countries of origin so that emigration produces the same result as 
death in reducing the size of a generation. 
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Eliminating the interference of external migration with the statistical observation of births and 
deaths has been an important concern for demographers. Following chemistry8, formal demography 
aims at studying fertility and mortality « in the pure state », and for this purpose needs to remove 
the blurring effect of external migration (Henry 1972). What would have been numbers of births 
and deaths recorded if no migration had taken place? is the question to be solved. Because 
migration is a selective process and because it changes the course of life, its statistical interference 
with fertility and mortality is a complex one. Had those who have emigrated the same probability 
of giving birth or of dying than those who have not emigrated? To which extent do birth rates and 
death rates obtained on incomplete statistics (they do not cover emigrants) apply to all members of 
the generation under consideration? How to deal with the dependence in probability of emigration 
on one side, and fertility or mortality on the other side? These questions have produced more 
interesting methodological developments in demography than additional knowledge on migration 
itself9. 
Measuring migration also fully enters within the scope of demography, insofar as the overall 
growth of any population is the addition of its external migration to its natural growth10. Because 
migrants have a specific age profile, their contribution to the age structure of the population has 
also become a topic of interest in demography, recently rekindled by the worry about consequences 
of ageing in industrialised countries. The question of how to balance decreasing fertility rates by 
sustained flows of immigrants has received a certain attention from demographers (Keyfitz 1981, 
Fargues 1989, United Nations 2000) 11. However, for logical reasons intrinsic to migration itself the 
modelling of external migration never went very far in demographic analysis12, and for limits 
                                          
8 Henry (1972) « Analyser, c’est décomposer un tout en ses parties : […] L’observation nous fournit des données à 
l’état brut […] Ces données brutes, qui peuvent paraître simples à un esprit superficiel, sont en réalité le fruit de 
combinaisons ou de mélanges fort compliqués où interviennent quantités d’éléments […] Comme en chimie, c’est à 
l’analyse qu’il revient d’isoler le phénomène à l’état pur […] Dans nos observations se mêlent l’effet du phénomène 
qui nous intéresse, la nuptialité, et des phénomènes perturbateurs, mortalité et migrations. » (p. 20-21). 
9 An overview of the (modest) place of migration in demography is given by Keely 2000). 
10 The balancing equation of population growth writes: P2 – P1 = B – D + I – E  where P1 and P2 name the total 
population at dates 1 and 2, and B, D, I, E are respectively the numbers of births, deaths, immigrants and emigrants 
recorded between dates 1 and 2. 
11 A much debated report of the United Nations (2000) dedicated to exploring how migration could bring an answer to 
ageing made use of population projections to answer the question « what level of migration from less developed 
countries would be required to compensate for negative demographic trends in more developed countries ? » 
12 Henry (1972)  « Dans l’état actuel de la démographie, on ne sait pas étudier les phénomènes ouverts en tant que tels 
[…] » « L’émigration d’une région A […]  concerne le membres de la population étudiée et fait sortir de cette 
population : […] L’immigration dans une région B résulte, elle, de l’arrivée de personnes étrangères à cette région […] 
les événements qui figurent au numérateur ne concernent pas les membres de la population figurant au dénominateur. 
[…] Il n’y a pas symétrie entre l’émigration de A vers B et l’immigration en B provenant de A : […] Dans ces 
conditions, l’étude des mouvements migratoires est, au moins sous son aspect théorique, une étude de sortie, 
d’émigration » (p. 198-9). 
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belonging to the social rather than biological nature of external migration, no robust framework of 
determinants comparable to those applied to mortality and fertility was never devised in the 
demographic study of migration. As Davis (1988) puts it « international migration […] resembles 
mortality and fertility in being part of the fundamental balancing equation in demography, which 
says that any population change is a function of natural increase and net migration  […] but unlike 
mortality and fertility, it has no biological constraints and hence no built-in limits. There is no 
‘normal’ or ‘natural’ rate of migration » (p. 245). 
 
2.   Modelling the Impact of International Migration on Birth Rates 
To sum up, demography basically deals with international migration as numbers to be added 
(immigration) or subtracted (emigration) to any population defined by national boundaries. No 
individual country has a zero balance of external migration, but the entire world has, because it 
obviously receives no external migration. Despite this indisputable fact we argue, however, that 
flows of international migration might change the total number of inhabitants on earth, as a result 
of the impact international migration can have on natural population growth, notably on birth 
rates13. We focus here on two particular sub-populations: migrants themselves, and the community 
they have left behind in home countries.  
For those who move, migration is susceptible to produce two distinct impacts on patterns of family 
building. The first is a short term one which results from imbalances in the sex-ratio of migration 
flows—labour migration (whether of men or of women) delays marriage and procreation, while 
migration of family reunification yields the opposite effect, and allows to recover birth rates 
deficits of previous steps in individuals’ life cycle—and a long term one resulting from the gradual 
adjustment of migrants to their host population, which translates into a convergence of migrants’ 
demographic patterns with those prevailing in receiving countries. This last effect is shown on 
Figure 1, left arrow. It is a limited one, since it affects only migrants themselves.  
Those who don’t move but live in communities from where numerous migrants have departed 
might also see their demography affected by migration. This will happen as soon as their living 
conditions are transformed by the emigration of relatives or neighbours on one side, and their 
conception of life is changed by alternative models to which they are exposed through the 
                                          
13 Mortality is also linked with migration. For example, an interesting “Mediterranean” pattern of health has been 
found among migrant populations (Khlat & Darmon 2003). Including mortality in the paper would have complicated 
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emigration of members of their community on the other side. Because expatriates are increasingly 
forming transnational communities in close contact with the environment left behind through fast 
travel and  telecommunications, modern migrants are still part of the game in their home countries 
in particular in the diffusion of models. Their possible impact on patterns of family building and 
procreation is shown on Figure 1, right arrow. It is an enlarged effect, not limited to migrants 
themselves and their close families, but extended to their entire local community at home, and 
possibly to the larger society through the media. This process interacts with the first one: the more 
adjusted the emigrants to their host society—and the better connected to the world left behind—the 
more efficient their diffusion of new models and ideas in their home society.  
This argument refers to the ideational frame of the demographic transition, by far less researched 
and less modelled than its structural frame. Much more has been written on the decline of fertility 
in relation with structural transformations such as the spread of mass education, urbanisation, or the 
shift from agriculture to services, than on the role played by culture and values in demographic 
change. As a consequence, empirical evidence is scanty: most, if not all, large fertility surveys 
designed on a highly standardised and comparative scheme14 have disregarded ideas and values, 
with the exception of a handful of questions directly related with family building, such as the ideal 
number children, sex preference, or views about marriage. For lack of individual data on more 
fundamental ideas and values expressing the way people see their lives, this paper will content 
itself with a macro approach, and will not reach the micro level which would allow a true 
validation of the hypothesis that migration is a vehicle for alternative ideas15.  
 
                                                                                                                                           
our purpose for only little added value, since mortality does not play as important a role as fertility in contemporary 
international demographic differentials. 
14 The core questionnaire of the World Fertility Survey (WFS) devised in the 1970s has been reproduced—with some 
amendments—in all major subsequent surveys, notably the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) of the 1980s-
1990s and the Papchild (1990s) and Papfam (2000s) initiated by the Arab League.  
15 At the other side of the spectrum, for lack of accurate time series on migration in many countries, the paper will not 
offer any estimation of the global demographic impact of international migration, that is the reduction of the world 
population rate of growth which can be attributed to migration. 
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Figure 1 : A framework of the impact of international migration on birth rates 
 
 
Initial patterns of Diffusion of new  
marriage and patterns of marriage 
birth spacing and birth spacing 







(I) Flows of (II) Flows of 







to patterns of marriage 
and birth spacing in 





3. Downstream Demographic Adjustment of Migrants 
When people move, they change their environment but not their selves. In a short lapse of time, 
they will be subjected to the living conditions prevailing in their new environment, which are 
important to determine the cost of children. For material reasons, migration will most probably 
affect the timing of childbearing and the desired number of children. It will take longer however for 
immigrants to change some of their individual characteristics, such as the level of education which 
is recognised an important determinant of fertility, and even longer to adapt to a new culture. This 
will happen either later in the course of their own lives or only to their children. A quick but limited 
effect of migration on fertility has thus to be expected, before any deeper shift takes place. 
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Table 1: Total fertility rates* (children per woman) of foreign citizen women 
residing in France, compared with their country of origin and with French women, 
around 1980, 1990 and 2000 
Citizenship Residence 1980 1990 2000 
Algerian France 4.22 3.22  3.19 
 Algeria 6.77 4.67 2.97 
Moroccan   France  5.14 3.51  3.32 
 Morocco 5.65 4.03 2.87 
Tunisian  France 5.21 3.93  3.29 
 Tunisia 5.30 3.62 2.16 
Turkish  France 5.13 3.73  3.35 
 Turkey 4.40 3.40 2.57 
French France 1.87 1.76 1.82 
* the total fertility rate (TFR) is the final average number of children born per woman, obtained as 
the sum of age specific fertility rates from 15 to 49 years, during a given period of time. 
Sources: France (in 1982, 1990, 1999): Legros 2003 ; Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey: United 
Nations 2003. 
 
In fact, the convergence of immigrants’ fertility with natives’ seems to be a slow process: for 
example in France—the country which hosts the largest Arab expatriate community—total fertility 
rates among immigrants women of MENA origin have decreased during the 1980s and the 1990s, 
thus reducing the distance with their host population, but surprisingly at a much slower pace than in 
their countries of origin (Table 1). Algerian women living in France have experienced an earlier 
fertility decline than those left behind in Algeria (6.77 children per women against 4.22 in 1980), 
but since this decline has been slower among the former than the latter, Algerian emigrants have 
now higher fertility rates than their non-migrant fellow citizens in Algeria (3.19 against 2.97 in 
2000). The same holds for Moroccan, Tunisian and Turkish women. This unexpected result is 
largely due to a statistical artefact resulting from two characteristics of migration: for women it is 
often caused by marriage (another result of which being fertility), and it is a selective phenomenon. 
To fully understand this artefact it has to be borne in mind that, after the quasi-closure of Europe to 
labour immigration starting from the mid 1970s, family reunification has become the first channel 
of legal entry for non-European aliens. Firstly, family reunification applies to wives or husbands, 
which means that a birth is very likely to follow shortly after migration16. On average, 49% of 
                                          
16 A high proportion of children are first children (as soon as fertility is low) and most first children are born during the 
first years of marriage. 
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Algerian immigrant women are married at the time of immigration in France, 52% of Moroccans 
and Tunisians and 59% of Turks (Borrel & Tavan 2003 ). That births delayed in countries of origin 
are recovered in countries of emigration clearly emerges from the fact that, for a same generation of 
women, those who reside in France for more than ten years have a much lower level of fertility 
than those arrived from less than ten years (Table 2)17. The demographic adjustment effectively 
operates, but only after a certain duration of stay. Secondly, family reunification tends to perpetuate 
the social selection of migrants, and those arrived in France at the time of massive labour migration 
(before 1974) where mostly unskilled workers, belonging to social groups with higher fertility than 
the national average in their home countries. 
 
Table 2: Total fertility rates in 1999 among foreign citizen women residing 
in France, according to date of immigration 
Nationality \ Date of immigration 1980-89 1990-99  
Algerians    2.66 4.08 
Moroccans   2.91 4.31 
Tunisians   2.66 4.46 
Turks  2.46 3.99 
Source: Legros 2003  
 
Before concluding this section, two remarks should be made. First, the social selection of migrants 
varies with home and host countries. For example, despite Egypt is a country with higher birth rates 
than Lebanon, Egyptian immigrants in Australia have much lower birth rates than Lebanese 
immigrants. In 1981, total fertility rates were 5.40 children per woman in Egypt and 4.05 in 
Lebanon, while their immigrant communities in Australia had total fertility rates of  2.51 and 4.80 
respectively (Young 1991). Egyptians in Australia were more advanced than Lebanese in their 
demographic transition, while the contrary was true for their countries of origin, a probable sign of 
upward social selection of migrants to Australia in Egypt and downward in Lebanon. As a result of 
convergence with native Australians, fertility declined from one generation of immigrants to next 
                                          
17 Carlson (1985) analyses in another context (the U.S.) how  the event of migration and a new social context combine 
to affect the vital rates of migrant populations. The timing of marriage remains affected by a cultural factor “which 
may be more than a simple combination of levels of schooling and job experience” (p. 64). The timing of births 
displays a strong, temporary and short-term impact of immigration, but no evidence of any longer-term effect: migrants 
are highly adaptable. 
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among Lebanese, but not among Egyptians who had since their arrival a lower fertility than 
average Australians18.  
The second remark on adjustment of migrants to their host societies is that convergence might 
happen faster in demography than in other family related issues. A survey among immigrants from 
Turkey and Morocco carried out in Belgium in the early 1990s found that in matters directly related 
with fertility, such as the desired family size, the preference for boys or girls, the utility of children 
and contraception, migration produces a decisive change. For example, the percentage of married 
women aged 25-29 using contraceptive was respectively 79% and 71% among Turkish and 
Moroccan women living in Belgium, compared with  44% and 35% in their countries of origin the 
same year. When it comes to marriage the choice of partner and female autonomy, however, only a 
« prudent shift in the code of conducts » is observed: marriage decided on free individual choice 
without parents interfering remains very rare and most often a source of conflict. Social and 
cultural changes would thus proceed at different paces according to domains, a phenomenon 
qualified as « heteropraxis » by the authors of the survey   (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1995).  
 
4.  Wahhabi  v/s Western Ways 
From the mid-1970s until the late 1980s, Arab countries have displayed a puzzling pattern of 
fertility differentials: contrary to what is observed at the level of the world—a strong negative 
correlation between GDP per capita and birth rates—the richest Arab countries were also those 
with the highest birth rates. As it will be briefly recalled in the next paragraph, this was a result of 
oil wealth and the particular type of state-to-society relationship it generated (Fargues 1988, 1993). 
Even more puzzling, when only non-oil Arab countries were compared with each other, some of 
those best endowed with what is considered universal factors of the fertility transition—such as 
good health or female education—were keeping higher level of fertility than countries less 
endowed with these same factors. In other words, a single country could be characterised at the 
same time by advance in well-being and delay in demographic matters19. This apparent anomaly 
was due in part to migration, which served as a vehicle for values and models. 
                                          
18 TFR had declined from 5.09 children per women among Lebanese immigrant women in Australia born in 1917-21 to 
4.35 for those born in 1937-41 (youngest generation having completed its fertility in 1981), while among Egyptians the 
decline was only from 2.57 to 2.42 (Young 1991). 
19 For example Jordan was better endowed than Morocco with regard to health or educational status of the population, 
but Morocco was far in advance on Jordan with regard to birth control. 
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All began in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Beforehand, all Arab countries except one, 
Lebanon, were still in a pre-transitional stage regarding fertility, with total fertility rates ranging 
from 6 to more than 8 children per woman according to country, and it was only in the second half 
of the 1970s that social and economic transformations began to translate into rising age at marriage 
among women (Rashad & Osman 2003) and birth control. However, in major Arab oil producing 
countries (the Gulf states, Libya and Algeria), the sudden change in scale of state revenues in the 
immediate aftermath of the 1973 war which sent crude oil prices soaring, jammed the transition of 
fertility. Oil revenues enabled governments to establish welfare state systems through financing 
development (health, education, etc.) on one hand, and subsidizing consumption on the other hand.  
While development activities were conducive to fertility decline, subsidized consumption, by 
reducing the cost of children, could work to the opposite effect. This is what happened in a number 
of Arab countries, especially the most oil-rich ones, whose governments, by keeping the population 
in check through generous oil wealth redistribution, were able to play the forces of social 
conservatism and change off against one another. Social conservatism was reflected in particular by 
a continuing very low labour force participation rate among married women20. So, by both cutting 
the costs of fertility and keeping women in the home, oil revenues indirectly promoted high 
fertility. To some extent, oil revenues “generated” population21. As if by contagion, the oil-type of 
early marriage and high birth rates persisted in non-oil countries of the Mashreq (except Lebanon), 
while in the distant Maghreb it gradually gave room to delayed marriage and birth control. The 
transition of fertility happened earlier in Tunisia and Morocco than in Jordan, Syria, Yemen and 
even Egypt. Migration offers a key for understanding what happened then. Figure 2 clearly shows 
that in the second half of the 1980s, when fertility differentials between MENA countries were 
peaking, All countries of emigration to the Gulf had an above-average level of fertility (upper-left 
panel of Figure 2) while all countries of emigration to the West had below average levels of 
fertility (lower-left panel). 
                                          
20 A mechanism sustained in the Gulf by labour imports, since women-dominated jobs—notably in education, health 
and administration—could be occupied by immigrant women. 
21 The oil crisis started in the mid-1980s gradually put an end to this mechanism.  
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Figure 2 : Migration and Fertility in MENAcountries
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As soon as a surprising pattern of Mashreq-Maghreb demographic differentials became clearly 
revealed by large fertility surveys in the late 1980s-early 1990s, the idea was advanced that « 
cultural models encountered through international migration to a certain extent reinforce the 
geography of demographic transition : the Maghreb, which has a foothold in Europe through its 
émigrés, has experienced a marked decline in its birth rate whereas the Egypt of the Infitâh, 
strengthening its Arab exchanges by a million and a half expatriates in the Gulf, saw it rise again 
temporarily from 1974 to 1985. […] After a decade when it constantly fell (1964-73), the birth rate 
rose again during the next (1974-85). It was probably less to do with military demobilization […] 
than with the input of various external resources : the Suez canal and oil again, American and Saudi 
aid, tourism and the savings of émigré workers were all sources of income which increased the 
circulation of goods and services beyond what Egypt was producing. Migration itself contributed to 
the renewed rise in the birth rate, because of the Egyptians’ contact with the large family standard 
common in the Gulf—footnote : For the same reason, one could assume that migration to Europe 
has accelerated the decline of the birth rate in the Maghreb » (Fargues 1993: 164). Later on, a 
comparison of Morocco with Egypt reiterated the hypothesis that emigration contributes to the 
diffusion in emigrants’ home countries of ideas and models prevailing in their host countries, and 
noted that contrasted marriage patterns were key factors differentiating the level of fertility in the 
two countries (Courbage 1995).  
Subsequent studies of marriage in Egypt revealed that rising material expectations and increased 
consumerism among the youth had affected the cost and the timing of marriage, and they attributed 
this transformation to changes in aspirations—notably regarding the acquisition of consumer 
durables—repatriated in Egypt from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries by waves of men labour 
migrants, as well as to actual increases in income and standards of living generated by emigrant 
workers remittances. Singerman and Ibrahim (2003) found that, with a dramatic increase in the 
1970s and the 1980s then a stabilisation in the 1990s, the cost of marriage in Egypt has been 
responding to the growing then stabilising size of the Egyptian labour migration to the Gulf. Other 
scholars have interpreted decreasing rates of economic activity among woman at 20-24 years 
between 1988 (24%) and 1998 (21%)—“contrary to the expectations for a period of structural 
adjustment”—as a sign that “modern marriage in Egypt may offer young girls something of greater 
value than the alternative of earning their own income through wage work” (Amin & Al-Bassusi  
2003: 3). Whatever strong they are, material motives are not the only force at play. Also ideas 
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matter. With this respect, it is probable that social and cultural conservatism—what can be labelled 
“wahhabi” values—encountered in Saudi Arabia by Egyptian migrants and brought back home to a 
more open Egyptian society, are part of the  explanation (Singerman & Ibrahim 2003).  
Why did Egyptians or Jordanians, but not Moroccans or Tunisians, translate material aspirations 
raised by the contact with wealthier societies into conservative views and practices in family 
building related matters? What are the mechanisms determining women to gain access to the 
wealth in circulation, either through marriage and rising dowry (Egypt and Jordan), or rather 
through economic activity and paid labour (Tunisia and Morocco) ? This paper’s contention is that 
international migration has served as a vehicle to the patriarchal model where emigrants were 
bound for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, and to the individualistic one when they were destined to 
Europe. In other words, migration is hypothesised to have brought about normative changes, 
whether towards reinforced control of the family over its members or towards increased individual 
autonomy.  
 
5.  Upstream diffusion of demographic models by migrants 
[Section to be further developed]  
[Methodological developments are skipped for readability]  
How to test the above hypothesis? Because experiment is impossible in history, the question of 
“what would have been the level of fertility had no international migration taken place?” must be 
approached indirectly, by means of proxy. Comparisons over time and space offer an imperfect but 
workable method. Morocco and Egypt are taken as examples in this section. 
The last three decades have been a period of  intense emigration for both countries. Annual flows 
of emigrants are not recorded, but remittances are. Money transferred by emigrants is directly 
linked with increases in household income that are hypothesised to play on patterns and timing of 
family building, and one can reasonably assume that their amount is a good proxy for the intensity 
of the overall relationship kept by emigrants with their home country, including ideas, values and 
models.  The contrast between Egypt (Figure 3) and Morocco (Figure 4) is striking. The time 
correlation between remittances and birth rates is as highly positive in the former (+0.623) as it is 
negative in the latter (-0.741).  
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This paper will not develop the particular role that can be attributed to state policies in the 
discontinuous history of birth control and fertility decline in Egypt (Fargues 1997), but content 
itself with noting how perfectly any change in private money transfers made by emigrants, 
translates with a time lag of around two to three years into a parallel change in birth rates: income 
provided by emigrants clearly plays a direct role on the cost of children (alleviated by additional 
resources from abroad) but not on the desired size of the family (unchanged). Morocco offers a 
pattern completely opposing to that of Egypt: not only remittances and birth rates vary in opposite 
directions, the first ascending and the second descending, but the irregularity of remittances 
contrasts with the perfect regularity of birth rates, as if remittances themselves had no direct impact 
on birth rates. It is rather the size of the Moroccan expatriate community and the intensity of non-
material links its members develop with Morocco which matter here: the continuous circulation of 
ideas is not subjected to the same vagaries as money transfers. To sum up, time series indicate that 
Egyptian migration to the Gulf did not bring home innovative attitudes regarding marriage and 
birth, but rather material resources—in quantity varying with years—for the achievement of 
traditional family goals. In Morocco, emigration to Europe has coincided with a fundamental 
Figure 3 : Remittances and Birth Rates in Egypt
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Time correlation is not causation, however. To say that migration truly contributes to determine the 
pace and direction of changes in birth rates rather than simply covariates with these changes—
which would happen if migration on one side, and the decline of fertility on the other side, were 
two independent outcomes of a same third evolution, such as an increasing openness of societies to 
the outside world—one has to verify that changes in birth rates vary with the degree of exposure to 
migration, i.e. that regions from where intense emigration has departed display more dramatic 
demographic changes than those with little or no emigration: the closer the agents of diffusion, the 
stronger their impact.  
Figure 4  : Remittances and Birth Rates in Morocco
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Effectively, in both countries the space correlation found between emigration and the pace of 
fertility transition is significant even though weaker than the time correlation discussed beforehand. 
In Egypt (Figure 5), the higher the rate of emigration the slower the process of fertility decline, a 
correlation which suggests that migration has curbed forces of change, possibly in relation with a 
stronger exposure to conservative ideas prevailing in countries of emigration, i.e. the Gulf and 
Saudi Arabia. On the contrary in Morocco (Figure 6) faster demographic changes is associated with 
higher rates of emigration, as if the contact with European culture and way of life established 
through emigrants had accelerated  demographic change.   
[A discussion of cofactors, in particular the spread of school education, shoud follow. Using 
multiple regression, it can be demonstrated that, when controlled for cofactors, the relation 
between emigration and the pace of fertility transition remains negative in Egypt and positive in 
Morocco] 
Figure 5 : Emigration to the Gulf and the Transition of Fertility in Egypt at the 
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When people move from one country to another, they change their cultural, social and economic 
environment, as well as their individual position in the environment where they actually live. Such 
a change impacts on the way they behave, including in matters related with demographic 
reproduction, like marriage and fertility. Not only migrants, but non-migrants left behind 
themselves can react to changes induced by human mobility. International migration modifies the 
material and ideational processes underlying the demographic transition. Beyond the space 
distribution of inhabitants on earth, it impacts on their reproduction. In which direction it alters 
demographic processes—producing either more, or less fertility—will depend upon the social, 
economic and cultural context in which migration takes place. 
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Populations of the Middle East and North Africa have known intense movements of international 
migration starting from the 1970s, i.e. during the critical decades of the demographic transition 
when fertility contrasts across the world were sharper than ever. Most emigrants from the Maghreb 
headed to Europe while most emigrants from the Mashreq took the way of the Arab Peninsula and 
the Gulf. The first encountered societies where small size families and individualistic values were 
predominant, while the second found societies with larger families than those left behind and 
deeper-rooted patriarchal values. From where they now lived, be it Europe or Arabia and the Gulf, 
these emigrants of modern times could keep close ties with their home society. Through these ties, 
they could have an impact on the way marriage and family building evolved in their country of 
origin. This paper has established that migration to Europe was in fact accompanied by an 
accelerated move towards low birth rates, while migration to the Gulf coincided with a slowed 
down pace of fertility transition. In other words, emigration has indirectly altered the demographic 
reproduction, i.e. population numbers (apart from the subtraction of emigrants themselves), and 
resulted in fewer inhabitants in the Maghreb and larger numbers in the Mashreq.  
Two wider conclusions can be drawn. The first relates to global demography. For most of modern 
international migrants, the host society has a lower level of fertility than the home society. From 
this point of view, migrants from the Maghreb to Europe are the rule and those from the Mashreq to 
Arabia and the Gulf, the exception. The acceleration of demographic transition found in the 
Maghreb to be correlated with migration to Europe suggests that, if a similar relation were to apply 
to any migration from high to low birth rates countries, then international migration would produce 
a global demographic benefit, under the form of relaxed demographic pressures at the level of the 
world. The second conclusion relates to the circulation of ideas. If it turns out that emigrants are 
agents of the diffusion of new ideas in matters related with family building, then the same may 
apply to a wider range of civil behaviours. Migrants would then prove to be genuine actors of 
social change in their country of origin.  
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Appended tables 
 
Table 4 : Estimation of Net Migration using UN sources – Example of Morocco, 1950-2000 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Year t Total Birth Death  Natural Expected Net 
 Population Rate Rate Increase Population Migration 
  [t,t+5] [t,t+5] [t,t+5]  [t,t+5] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
1950 8953 0,0504 0,0257 0,0247 8953 2 
1955 10132 0,0504 0,0227 0,0277 10130 -11 
1960 11626 0,0501 0,0196 0,0305 11637 -218 
1965 13323 0,0482 0,0174 0,0308 13541 -231 
1970 15310 0,0456 0,0157 0,0299 15541 -474 
1975 17305 0,0394 0,013 0,0264 17779 -365 
1980 19382 0,0371 0,0114 0,0257 19747 -45 
1985 21995 0,0323 0,0089 0,0234 22040 -161 
1990 24564 0,0267 0,0074 0,0193 24725 -214 
1995 26839 0,0244 0,0066 0,0178 27053 -229 
2000 29108 0,0232 0,006 0,0172 29337 -158 
2005 31564 - - - 31722  
____________________________________________________________________ 
1950-2005      -2104 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Columns (1) to (3) United Nations 2003; Columns (4) to (6) computed by the author as: (4)=(2)-(3) ; 
(5)=(1)*Exp[(4)x*2.5] ; (6)=(1)-(5) 
 
N.B. Table 4 shows how migration flows can be estimated (very imperfectly) in the absence of any 
reliable source on migration, using the United Nations demographic database. Cumulated migration 
from 1950 to 1990 (amounting to -1,503 in the example of Morocco) divided by the total 
population in 1990 (24,654 million in Morocco) gives the rate of cumulated migration provided in 
Table 5 (Morocco: -6.1%).  
2004 – WS 03 – Fargues – Page 24 of 28 
Table 5 : Migration and Fertility in Selected Arab Countries at the Time of Maximum Variation in 
Fertility 
________________________________________________________ 
Country Cumulated Total Fertility Rate 
  Migration 1950-90 / Population 1990 1985-90 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Western Migration System 
Morocco -6.1% 4.6 
Algeria -7.3% 4.8 
Tunisia -11.2% 3.9 
Lebanon -34.3% 3.4 
Turkey -2.3% 3.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Gulf Migration System 
Egypt -4.5% 5.4 
Palestine -60.0% 6.6 
Syria -3.1% 6.6 
Yemen -9.1% 7.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Cumulated migration is computed by the author applying the method described in Table 4.  
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 Table 6: Remittances and births rates in Egypt 1970-2000 
 
Year BR Remittances M$ Year BR Remittances M$  
 per Current 1970  per Current 1970 
 1000 prices prices  1000 prices prices 
1970 36.4 29 29 1986 37.6 2505 446 
1971 36.3 27 52 1987 35.4 3604 407 
1972 36.1 104 79 1988 33.2 3770 368 
1973 36.3 117 143 1989 30.8 3293 305 
1974 36.1 268 195 1990 28.8 3743 240 
1975 36.7 365 324 1991 27.6 2569 192 
1976 37.2 755 429 1992 26.9 3028 177 
1977 38.4 928 652 1993 27.4 3835 172 
1978 38.4 1773 824 1994 27.7 3232 168 
1979 38.2 2213 1041 1995 27.9 3279 144 
1980 36.9 2696 956 1996 27.8 2798 137 
1981 36.7 2181 869 1997 27.3 3256 137 
1982 37.2 2439 876 1998 27.3 3718 143 
1983 38.4 3666 907 1999 27.4 3772 143 
1984 39.0 3963 828 2000 27.4 3747 136 
1985 38.6 3212 570     
Sources: Birth rates: CAPMAS; remittances at current prices: Central Bank of Egypt; at 1970 prices: computed by the 
author using indexes of prices provided by CAPMAS. 
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Table 7: Remittances and births rates in Morocco 1980-2000 
 
Year BR Remittances (MDir) Year BR Remittances (MDir)  
 per Current 1980  per Current 1980 
 1000 prices prices  1000 prices prices 
1980 39.0 4211 4211 1991 28.1 18739 8681 
1981 38.1 5484 4556 1992 27.3 19796 8471 
1982 37.2 5697 4866 1993 26.6 19876 8116 
1983 36.1 6787 5034 1994 24.2 19261 7559 
1984 35.0 7990 5669 1995 23.9 18711 7293 
1985 33.8 10378 6552 1996 23.6 20622 7173 
1986 32.7 13548 7394 1997 23.2 20255 7406 
1987 31.6 14135 7361 1998 22.8 22025 7356 
1988 30.8 11683 6956 1999 22.4 21120 7851 
1989 29.9 12400 7264 2000 21.9 25784 8685 
1990 29.0 17688 8009 
 
Source: Annuaire statistique du Maroc, various years.     
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Table 8: Emigration to the Gulf and the Transition of Fertility in Egypt at 
the time of the Gulf War (1991), by Governorate 
_________________________________________________________ 
Governorate Returnees  Percentage of the 
 from Iraq & Kuwait Fertility Transition 
 per 1,000 inhabitants Completed in 1991 
_________________________________________________________ 
Port Sa‘îd 4.52 76.1% 
Cairo 5.26 74.1% 
Alexandria 4.02 65.1% 
Suez 3.91 60.1% 
Qalyûbiyya 2.66 59.3% 
Buhayra 6.18 58.8% 
Gharbiyya 11.61 58.7% 
Minûfiyya 6.70 56.4% 
Aswân 2.17 56.2% 
Dumyât 13.03 53.7% 
Daqahliyya 14.29 53.5% 
Isma‘îliyya 4.43 50.5% 
Sharqiyya 5.24 48.7% 
Gîza 3.67 48.3% 
Kafr al-Shaykh 9.04 46.1% 
Banî-Suwayf 10.32 40.1% 
Fayûm 6.88 37.9% 
Qîna 10.88 29.3% 
Asyût 13.90 25.9% 
Minyâ 9.45 25.2% 
Suhâg 23.48 15.5% 
_________________________________________________________ 
Source: Geographical distribution of returnees provided in Khûrî 1991. Percentage of the 
fertility transition completed in 1991 computed by the author as [45-CBR(1991)]/30 
where Crude Birth Rates by Mohâfaza in 1991 are given by CAPMAS. 
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Table 9: Emigration and the Transition of Fertility by Province in Morocco 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Province (1) (2)  Province (1) (2)  
____________________________________________________________________________ 
   Oued Ed-Dahab  42%    Oujda-Angad  7,1 77% 
   Boujdour 5,4 29%    Taourirt 1,0 70% 
   Laâyoune 1,1 61%    Casablanca 9,6 95% 
   Es-Semara 7,3 39%    Mohammedia  11,1 81% 
   Guelmim 7,4 53%    Khémisset  3,4 64% 
   Tan-Tan  67%    Rabat  12,0 99% 
   Tata 3,1 39%    Salé-Al Jadida  3,1 65% 
  Agadir-Ida ou Tanane 13,4 76%    Skhirate-Témara  3,5 71% 
  Chtouka-Aït Baha  4,7 68%    El Jadida 2,6 62% 
  Inezgane-Aït Melloul  0,9     Safi 2,2 45% 
  Ouarzazate  15,4 44%    Azilal 0,8 43% 
  Taroudannt 4,2 63%    Béni Mellal 9,4 81% 
  Tiznit  12,3 68%    El Hajeb  6,8 63% 
  Zagora  35%    Errachidia  7,3 55% 
  Kénitra  5,6 65%    Ifrane  4,2 59% 
  Sidi Kacem  3,9 47%    Khénifra  3,4 69% 
  Ben Slimane  6,0 73%    Meknès-El Menzeh  19,6 90% 
  Khouribga  10,1 72%    Boulemane  2,3 52% 
  Settat  8,3 59%    Fès Jdid-Dar Dbibagh  11,4 69% 
  Al Haouz   26%    Sefrou  4,7 76% 
  Chichaoua   26%    Al Hoceïma  12,9 35% 
  El Kelaâ des Sraghna  5,1 66%    Taounate 3,3 39% 
  Essaouira   54%    Chefchaouen 0,8 19% 
  Marrakech-Médina  4,0 80%    Fahs-Bni Makada  40% 
  Berkane 0,7 70%    Larache 13,6 41% 
  Figuig  3,2 57%    Tanger-Assilah 19,4 68% 
  Jerada   45%    Tétouan 4,1 58% 
  Nador  6,1 67%  Total 6,7 57% 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
(1) Emigrants, per 1,000 inhabitants 
(2) Percentage of the Fertility transition achieved between 1984 and 1992 
Source : Author’s calculation from Hamdouch 2000 (emigrants) and CERED, various dates (birth rates)  
